The overall idea that Habermas is making is that we need to know how to understand one another by setting up universal conditions of possible mutual understanding. He gives a basic list of how to accomplish this, which includes: speak intelligibly, give the hearer something to understand, make yourself understandable, and come to an understanding with someone else. He also goes through several other concepts of reconstructive procedures, two objections against certain starting points for theory formulation, and ends up comparing and contrasting universal pragmatics with transcendental hermeneutics. This last part is what I currently struggle with. If something is transcendental, then by definition it would be hard to quantify. So entering into a discussion of whether something is communicated well would need to stay in the realm of what can be defined and quantified. Maybe this is the point that Habermas is making and I am losing it in the translation. There are also several places where I understand what Habermas is saying, but the connection to the previous concept seems unclear. In fact, that happens often for me. Maybe I am thinking too much like a connectivist for this chapter.

The articles that we read are much more straight forward to understand. I like getting a historical perspective of where educational technology came from, and how current technologies are trending in different settings. The Eraut article could be a bit depressing at times, just because is seemed like some of the problems that were written about several decades ago still exist today (for example, getting money to fund educational advances often means partnering with organizations that might have political agendas that conflict with educational interests). The Bichelmeyer and Molenda felt a bit problematic in that they often compared different types of results on the same charts just because there were different questions or methods over different years. Obviously there was no way to go back in time and fix this, but it also makes it hard to get true comparisons of trends.

In Bernstein’s writings, I understand and identify with how philosophy struggles with both the past and future as it attempts to remain neutral. Bernstein sums up his own writings well when he points out that his discussions of various viewpoints is meant to show how appealing to history is a “critical function” of philosophy. Philosophy will lose its identity if it forgets its past. I can’t say that I have ever really looked at it this way, but our collective identity as a society is massively shaped by our shared history. Turning our backs on that would be akin to a conscious decision to contract a collective amnesia. What is unclear to me is how we keep fighting on both fronts without getting stretched too thin. Hopefully that will be the topic of exploration in future chapters.